Russia and the Allies

[generalzo]

Maybe it could be said that there is more reason to say that "Allied Intervention in Russia" is product of Bolshevik propaganda, then that, in fact, there was any real foreign intervention in the Russian Civil War. Yes, there were many foreign troops on the territory of Russia, but where did they have one real, serious battle against Bolsheviks? Someone could have impression that some of Russian Allies, in their avarice, hadn't a wish to see an easy victory of Russian patriots. (Bolsheviks were not seriously understood by many politicians of the time. There was widespread opinion that they are not able to endanger world stability, but only temporarily to weaken Russia.) Why on the peace congress in Versailles there was no place for representatives of Russian government, that is representatives of Russian provisional government from Omsk, which was broad coalition of all patriotic and liberal forces of Russia? (For example, Admiral Kolchak's representatives in Paris were Sergius Sazonov, ex-minister, and Boris Savinkov, ex-terrorist). Maybe because of the avarice that is mentioned? Why did the Allies, who had millions and millions of soldiers, stop their intervention in Russia after November of 1918? Why was Russia paying (in gold) to the Allies for weapon, which was completely useless for them in that moment? After the end of the war the Allies had so many weapons, that most of them was useless. But they still wanted it to be paid (Bolsheviks had almost all - not small - material reserves of the old army in their possession).
The Allies were opposed to Bolsheviks because they were going to get Russia out of the war. That is, the Allies needed dead bodies of Russian soldiers on Eastern front. When this need disappeared, their wish to overthrow Bolsheviks was enormously diminished. They had the interest, as USA and Japan (and not Brazil or Sweden) had their interests in Siberia. So, USA troops were there more because of the fear of Japan, than fear of Bolsheviks. And about Japanese troops in Vladivostok till 1922, what were they doing there? Fighting against Bolsheviks? Well, they were mostly making problems to government in Omsk (by supporting people like ataman Semenov), because from May of 1918 there was no Bolsheviks on thousands of kilometers from there.
Poland started a war with Soviet Russia in April of 1920, using help of the White army of general Wrangel and guerrilla detachments in western parts of Russia (so-called "Greens"). I believe that the date of Polish attack on Soviet Russia was not accidental. Poles waited for defeats of Russian patriots, who wanted united Russia and because of that were obstacle to formation of "Great Poland", so that they (Poles) could impose them terms for future relations between Russia and Poland (or just to use their army in war). And with Polish help in autumn of 1919, Bolshevism would have probably been destroyed. Maybe some Western politicians had the similar strategy as Poland: maybe they wanted to see weak Russia (rather anti-Bolshevik, than Bolshevik one, but that was not priority) and, by their passivity in regard to Russian civil war, to remove an obstacle to their short-sighted imperial plans. Well, if we look on British foreign politic from 1815 to 1907, we can notice its constant anti-Russian direction. Its change was result of British fear of German expansion, which prevailed over the enmity towards Russia. It is logical to suppose that, after disappearance of German threat, Great Britain continued (certainly in a different form) with its previous policy in regard to Russia. Great Britain unwillingly gave promises of Constantinople and channels to Russia in 1915, so existing of strong Russia, who could demand this, probably wasn't British interest.
There is an interesting book about this subject, "Memoirs of a British Agent", written by R.H. Bruce Lockhart. Lockhart, who was a diplomat of Great Britain in Russia during WW1, writes that only few Englishmen considered Bolshevism a threat to the Western civilization. Author also express his personal opinion (and he writes that it seems to him that British Ministry of Foreign Affairs had a similar attitude) that it would have been better if Great Britain had tried to induce Bolsheviks to enter in war with Germany and to made an alliance with them. Moreover, he had few serious conversations with Bolshevik leaders on that subject. Principal reason for beginning of conflict between Bolsheviks and Allies Lockhart sees in spontaneous rebellion of Czechs in May of 1918.
I'm also going to cite the most interesting part of the work of Russian politician Boris Sokolov "Padenie Severnoi Oblasti"("The Fall of the Northern Region"), who was present in Paris during Peace Conference in 1919:
"If someone carefully examines complete Peace Conference, all of its works and decisions in parts directly or indirectly in connection with Russia, he can notice one tendency: to weaken Russia, to put she on zero.
Even Poincare, who was not enemy of Russia, but one of she's half-friends, noticed very simply: "Now, when, instead of Russia, Poland is appearing on the East, Russian question lost all meaning for European balance. From now on, Russia belongs more to Asia, than to Europe."
And about that, which was not said, which was concealed in decisions of Conference, about that much, too much was spoken behind the scenes of it.
[...]
And what kind of projects they were making and imagining!
In the days of Petliura's success, Clemenceau presents project of union of Poland and Ukraine, under hidden protectorate of France, of course.
After that, now from the side of Great Britain, it is suggested necessity of confederacy of Baltic states. Caucasus, Far East etc, without an end."
Here is also an account of Sergius Melgunov (1879-1956), one of the greatest Russian historians, about American troops in Siberia:
"In the example of Americans in Siberia, we can clearly see unnatural forms in which "intervention" was developing. After much hesitation, it was accepted in America. But "the public opinion" of the state was still confused why "Russian intelligentsia is in war with such progressive party, as Bolsheviks", - that was said to Vologodsky by correspondent of American newspaper from Vladivostok. That confusion in American public opinion, may be, was the reason why American action in Siberia at the beginning got a strange character. All documents are in accord with that. Here is the note of Boldirev in Vladivostok from December 16th:
[...] "Their soldiers and sailors, after drinking of Russian vodka, already are singing: "I am a Bolshevik, to hell" ..."
[...]
That sympathy for Bolsheviks is noticed by Bolsheviks themselves. In Habarovsk Communist were making connections with "progressive comrades of American detachment of intervention armies". About Sunchan region local anti-Kolchak partisans are speaking: "Among American soldiers there were emigrants from imperial Russia. We succeeded in making of connection with Americans, so that we got possibility to progressively get bullets, and there were even consultations about getting of guns, revolvers, bombs and, finally, machine-guns..." [...] That "illegal marriage" and neighbourly relations of American command with revolutionary headquarters resulted in "agreements" with partisans and helped their strengthening and disorganization of Kolchak's rear.
Naturally, Kolchak raised a question of sending away of American troops already in April of 1919, and Sukin, adherent of Americans, informed Sazonov that "sending away of American troops is the only way for saving of friendly relations with United States". "
And, finally, let us hear general Denikin, a key participant of the events in question:
"The Allies, from the beginning to the end, hadn't any Russian policy at all. They were making short-sighted plans for retaining of Eastern front, firstly with Bolsheviks, who had already demobilized the army, and latter with Ukrainian Rada, which had already started the peace negotiations with Germany... They were now counting on White fronts, and now on "bulwarks" made of new-founded frontier states... They were now moving Czechoslovakian corps along the endless Trans-Siberian railway, to accomplish fantastical plan of transporting them on the Western-European battle-field, now they were returning them to form a front on Volga, and now they were again realizing them from the burden of the liberation war...
In autumn of 1918, they are categorically demanding from German armies to leave Baltic region; in January of 1919, they are blessing formation and advancing of von der Goltz's corps against Bolsheviks, and in June they are demanding its dissolution, threatening Germany with hard sanctions... They are sending their troops in Archangelsk, where were large stores of war provisions and... rich forests, but from where every diversion against Soviets was hopeless; and in extremely
suitable and close bases - Riga and Revel - they are sending only the military representatives; and, by the way, the fleet, which is excellently bombing German-Russian detachments advancing on Riga, but which is with no bullet giving support to general Judenitch, who is on his way to Peterburg...
They were sending the armies in Odessa and Crimea to, already after the first skirmish with Bolsheviks, left all in the two-day evacuation... They were sending them also in Baku, where the oil is, but where wasn't any Bolsheviks, but they didn't send any soldier on front in Don region, which in the same moment started to falter... They are, with loud declarations, landing the armies in Vladivostok and... they are limiting their activity on protecting of the port, with its enormous stores, and helping of Czechoslovakian escape...
They hurried to hastily announce recognitions of all new-founded states, but they refused to recognize government of Admiral Kolchak... And not earlier that in 1920, in the moment when lord Carson suggested to army of Russian South surrender to Bolsheviks and, after that, started the negotiations with them, France firstly de facto recognized government of Russian South... to save imperilled Poland.
But, simultaneously, the Allies - by the way, almost exclusively Englishmen - and we shall never forget that - were sending abundant material help to White fronts, and without it our struggle on them would not have been so persistent.
In that attitude about Russian question - both of the Central Powers and of the Entente, there is one essential and common characteristic: forgetting of moral principle and too much expressed state materialism. All of these states were led exclusively by their own interest. Miserable Russian people were not their concern. They could go with Bolsheviks, and against Bolsheviks. They could unite or divide Russia - only if that was in agreement with their national interest - all because of their short-sighted understanding, deprived of historical foresight, which have much contributed to the emerging of the present world crisis."
General Denikin made not small number of mistakes in his actions during Civil War and few mistakes in his later analysis, but, I believe, they were mostly due to his great patriotism, which he showed in occupied France during World War Two by refusing any kind of collaboration with enemies of Russian nation.
But White idea was never understood in the West, and even when Denikin in 1945 came to live in United States, he was insulted by the demonstrators as "killer of Jews". Ironically, I think, because his victory would not have only prevented many deaths of Jews, together with members of other nations, during "Red terror" 1917-1956 (and Stalin apparently had even worse plans in regard of Jews), but it would almost certainly have prevented Hitler's genocide.
That is opening another question: What would have happened if Hitler had been faced with non-Bolshevik Russia when he started his mad actions against Versaille's order of things? I personally believe (and this is not an exaggeration) that, in that case, Hitler would not have dared to do anything against European peace, and even in the case of a psychopathic attempt to do something in that direction, he would have been, after only few week, crushed between France and Russia. Exactly because of that policy of Western states in regard of Russian civil war was short-sighted. I think it is not so important that Hitler wanted to ruin Versailles peace and attack Russia (psychopathic political ideas are always widespread in the days of crisis), but it is important to understand why he had an opportunity to make a serious attempt to do that. And this was possible, I believe, only because France hadn't real ally in the East. Well, I think it is general opinion that if France had energetically attacked Germany in September of 1939, Hitler wouldn't have been able to sustain war on two fronts, against French and Polish army. It can be easily imagined what would have been, if instead of Poland, there were Russia on German Eastern front!
But the main problem was the fact that the new-founded states in Eastern Europe all together where not able to substitute Russia in her role of the principal French ally. What did Poland against Hitler till 1939? Nothing. "Little Entente" was, in fact, made against Hungary, and it wasn't able to resist Germany. When Hitler destroyed its member, Czechoslovakia, it simply ceased to exist.
So, policy of Western states in regard of Russian Civil War was short-sighted because they hadn't worked enough to assist in overthrowing the Bolsheviks and in recovery of Russia. The resurrection of Russia would have been the best guarantee of European peace.

[Edited by generalzo on 25th July 2005 at 01:23]

[generalzo]

But, it must be said that the main problem of White movement wasn't lack of support from the West, but lack of support in Russia. If there had been the slightest tactical unity of the main opponents of Bolsheviks, they would have been easily defeated at the very beginning of the war. I'm not thinking on lack of support from the separatists, anarchists (it could almost be said that anarchistic army of Nestor Mahno made a decisive blow to Denikin's armies attacking his rear during his advance on Moscow in autumn of 1919) or bandit Cossack or partisan units, but from the socialists and, on the first place, from the real Russia - peasantry (they both became great victims of Bolshevik regime). Although large part of responsibility for rupture of the Russian socialists with White movement belongs to its leaders, the blindness of Russian revolutionaries, who (with few exceptions) were neutral during the war against Bolsheviks or even (after the breakdown of Ufa coalition) supporting them, is tragic. But even more tragic is neutrality of Russian peasantry: at the end of civil war and after it (1920-1922), followed a series of peasant insurrections against Bolsheviks (there were about 50 000 insurgent peasants only in Tambov region), which forced Lenin to completely change his revolutionary strategy. If this anger against Bolsheviks had been joined with White struggle... But White movement didn't find the ways to the minds of Russian peasantry and it was destroyed - not only by Bolsheviks, but also by internal anarchy (The terror of the White armies was more a result of anarchy than of political will, and it was never a part of political ideology, as it was the case with Bolsheviks) and short-sighted regional or personal egoism. And last, but not least, one of the main problems of the White movement was a lack of co-ordination between the White armies. The military help from the West, by my opinion, was most needed on the South of Russia and in Ukraine after the capitulation of Germany (the very beginning of 1919). Denikin led apparently very successful offensive on Moscow (September-October of 1919), but it ended in catastrophe because it followed a half of year after a great offensive from the East. With the help of Allies, the joined effort would have probably resulted in decisive victory.
So, Russia, in fact, had enough forces to defeat Bolsheviks without any help from the West. That help was the last and, in the same time, very bad solution. Government established by foreign soldiers probably would not have been able to give real peace and unity to Russia (I think the present situation in Iraq isn't a bad example for this statement). But when unity of Russian anti-Bolsheviks was impossible, the very bad solution - military intervention - was still better that the worst possible solution - victory of Bolshevik terrorists.

During revolutions of 1905 and 1917 Russian peasantry wished confiscation of real estate from landowners. But beside this, it hadn't much common with socialist ideas. In 1906 or 1907 peasants voted for the socialists (mostly moderate ones - trudoviks), but their support wasn't as general as it was in the madness of 1917; after the breakdown of the revolution, that support was mostly lost. So, as I have said, they were supporting some practical short-term aims of the socialists, but never their parties, which never succeeded in making of the networks of local organizations in Russian villages. After the final victory of revolution in March of 1917, Russian peasantry simply wanted to get land in its private or collective property. Russian peasants voted for SRs in November of 1917 (c. 20 millions voters or c. 50% of them), because they had understood SR program as fulfillment of peasant wishes. But, Russian peasant never had any peculiar ideology: there were in his mind traces of socialism, but also comparatively strong monarchical and religious ideas. So, it must be noticed that this fact (majority of SRs, and the rest of the votes mostly given to Bolsheviks, who had accepted SR agrarian program) has very relative value, especially having on mind that majority of voters were simple peasants and that Russia in autumn of 1917 was a great madhouse: if there had been elections with universal suffrage only a year before (in autumn of 1916) it is almost certain that Russia would have got a monarchical parliamentary majority. [ Similar examples could be found in histories of two other great revolutions: 1) France voted for absolutely republican parliament (Convent) in the madness of 1792; three years latter, had been regular and free elections (instead of artillery fire on the demonstrators), a new parliament would have re-established monarchy and proclaimed Louis XVIII a king. 2) In 1659 there was some kind of referendum in England - a great majority voted for republic; next year, when King Charles II came back in his fatherland, he was accepted with general delight. ] During the Civil War they were not giving support neither to Bolsheviks, neither to White movement, neither to SRs. They were simply neutral or they were defending their lives or corn from the fighting armies or bands (and sometimes their churches from Bolshevik blasphemy). They wanted land in their private or collective property, but they were absolutely opposed to any forms of agricultural production based on the socialistic theories. They weren't, of course, much interested in a continuation of the monarchy, but that was neither a proclaimed aim of the White movement. [ The White movement, which only official ideology was "fighting against Germans and Bolsheviks" and, maybe, "united Russia" (and never re-establishment of monarchy), was supported by the Russian intelligentsia (at the end of 1917 the Voluntary Army, a germ of White movement, was formed from the officers, soldiers and STUDENTS), all non-socialist parties and few prominent revolutionaries (N.Chaikovsky, V.Burcev, B.Savinkov) and Cossacks (it must be remembered their long tradition of freedom). Its leaders were Anton Denikin, liberal, and Alexander Kolchak, almost completely apolitical person, and it was politically supported and led on the first place by the members of the Kadet party. For example, Victor Pepelaev, who was president of Russian Provisional Government in Omsk (and who was executed with Kolchak in February of 1920 in Irkutsk), was a Kadet. Kolchak's apolitical position and lack of interest for re-establishment of monarchy can be found in protocols of his cross-examination in February of 1920 - he knew that he was close to his death and he hadn't a reason to hide ideas for which he gave his life. One more detail: in April of 1917, as commander of Russian fleet in Black Sea, he came in St. Petersburg to find support from the new regime for saving of order in the fleet. There he met Georgy Plekhanov, father of the Russian social-democracy, who latter described him as a good-minded man and a good officer, but complete political ignorant (Kolchak thought Plekhanov was a leader of SRs). Kolchak himself wasn't the leader of the coup d'état of 18 November 1918. He took no active part in that event (publicly, at least). That coup probably was a mistake, but not as great as SRs inactivity in a struggle against Bolsheviks (under Kolchak's regime they were arrested, under Bolsheviks they were destroyed). ] So, to cut a long story short, Russian peasantry hadn't any determined political will in the years of Civil War. In the case of the victory of White movement, peasant would not have given any political resistance. They would have only defending their land, but there would not have been need for such things because leaders of White movement never thought it was possible to oppose to unanimous wish of peasants - even the greatest rightist of them, General Wrangel, proclaimed that the land belongs to the one who cultivates it. I think it could be said that neutrality of Russian peasantry in the Civil War was partially due to a great misunderstanding.

[Zbyszek]

Originally posted by generalzo
... Poland started a war with Soviet Russia in April of 1920, using help of the White army of general Wrangel and guerrilla detachments in western parts of Russia (so-called "Greens"). I believe that the date of Polish attack on Soviet Russia was not accidental. Poles waited for defeats of Russian patriots, who wanted united Russia and because of that were obstacle to formation of "Great Poland", so that they (Poles) could impose them terms for future relations between Russia and Poland (or just to use their army in war). And with Polish help in autumn of 1919, Bolshevism would have probably been destroyed. Maybe some Western politicians had the similar strategy as Poland: maybe they wanted to see weak Russia (rather anti-Bolshevik, than Bolshevik one, but that was not priority) and, by their passivity in regard to Russian civil war, to remove an obstacle to their short-sighted imperial plans. Well, if we look on British foreign politic from 1815 to 1907, we can notice its constant anti-Russian direction. Its change was result of British fear of German expansion, which prevailed over the enmity towards Russia. ....

It is probabbly correct analysis although you need to bear in mind that Poland, nearly miraculously resurrected in 1918 after long 123 years of foreign rule (Russian rule was particularly hostile) had plenty of internal problems as well as border problems on all sides at that time. I also ask a question myself how it was possible that a country torn between three powers for so long, kept enough cohesion to challenge the Soviets and win the war under extremely difficult conditions.
Poland had smart leadership at that time and but the Eastern gains came at the cost of Western losses. The Czechs occupied the Tesin county and incorporated it against the will of its inhabitants. The Germans torn all Silesia away and three consecutive uprisings of local population were neeeded for limited successs, given the indifference if not boycott of influential British government at that time.
Pilsudski did not believe Wrangel or Kolchak. He knew them all too well. His policy proved successful although the risk was enormous. Helping Kolchak was something beyond imagination for the majority of Poles at that time. We must remember that the Bolsheviks appeared as justful eumenides for many leftists and the poor in all Europe. Their image was not as bad as it is now. Pilsudski had to take it into account. The Polish parliament opinion was also very important. It is funny how some Russo-centric people posting here shed crocodile tears over treacherous policy of Pilsudsky. Historically, there was no reason to give any help for a nation representatives of which repeatedly (and totally unsuccessfully) tried to russify an old and well developed culture [let me remind just one - Muravyoff 'Vyeshatyel']. Pilsudsky was correct assuming that strong, centrally governed Russia was none of Polish interest. His action saved Poland and all Western Europe a lot of trouble.

[generalzo]

Sorry, but I must disagree with your statement. From the standpoint of Polish nationalism 1918-1920 his politic most likely was correct, but from the standpoint of the lasting European peace (and I was speaking about that) it was, no doubt, short-sighted.
“Pilsudski did not believe Wrangel or Kolchak. He knew them all too well. His policy proved successful although the risk was enormous.”
Pilsudski knew them all too well? Who? Wrangel and Kolchak or Russians in general? Maybe you wanted to say that he had generalized opinion about Russians? Or – in the other words – prejudice? Old Russia disappeared in March of 1917, there was no back. General Denikin was half-Pole, born in Warsaw, and liberal in the politics – why it was impossible to make agreement with him in 1919 and defeat Bolsheviks and remove the constant threat for the European peace? 123 years of foreign rule? True, but wasn’t the right time to start a new epoch in the relations between Poland and Russia, based on the same, Slav origin and culture and new friendship, instead of the old hatred? No one reasonable in Russia was against independent Poland, why than the recovered state anachronistically needed to recover its 17th century’s territory? Why it was impossible to take only the regions where Poles were in majority?
Pilsudski’s policy was successful? I would not agree. He only died before its results became obvious. Was it wise to made enemies in the East as in the West? Was his later politic which resulted in the agreement with Hitler’s Germany in 1934 also proved to be successful? I think – no. Catastrophe of September 1939 was in great measure due to the Pilsudski’s “successful” policy.

[Zbyszek]

Originally posted by generalzo
Sorry, but I must disagree with your statement...

... No one reasonable in Russia was against independent Poland, why than the recovered state anachronistically needed to recover its 17th century’s territory? Why it was impossible to take only the regions where Poles were in majority?
Pilsudski’s policy was successful? I would not agree. He only died before its results became obvious. Was it wise to made enemies in the East as in the West? Was his later politic which resulted in the agreement with Hitler’s Germany in 1934 also proved to be successful? I think – no. Catastrophe of September 1939 was in great measure due to the Pilsudski’s “successful” policy.

Generalzo, I have to make my reply short. I hope to be able to write more soon.

About disagreement - you are welcome with it. Nothing could be more boring than "constructive talk of mutual understanding".

I really can not assess what was real political clout of those reasonable in Russia. It seems they were weak after long, exhausting war.
It was extremely difficult to determine areas where Poles were in majority because winds of history placed them in so many different places east or west. They were majority in Lvov or Wilno but they were so mixed with Germans in Silesia. Yes, I would agree that Poland was too much interested in the eastern territories at that times.
Roman Dmowski, a major opponent of Pilsudski, tried to base Poland's independence on Russia. He performed very well at Versailles conference but Britain's stand was so much in favour of defeated Germany that he could not achieve much success.
Pilsudski's policy was successful right after WWI but later on things got more and more difficult. Who, in wildest dreams, could predict Hitler's and Stalin's sick appetites?
I think Pilsudski's both non-agression agreements with Germany and Soviet Russia(yes!) were good political moves.

[mikeaverko]

Poland attacked Rusia in 1919 and not 1920.

Pilsudski refused an alliance with the Whites, despite the latter recognizing Polish independence.

Years later, it was revealed by two of Pilsudski's generals that he made a then secret pact with the Boslshes not to aid the Whites. As a matter of fact, Red commander Tukhachevsky is on record as saying that if a Polish-White alliance had come about, the outcome of the Russian Civil war would have been different.

[generalzo]

Originally posted by mikeaverko
Poland attacked Rusia in 1919 and not 1920.

Yes, the conflict between Poles and "Reds" started after German evacuation of occupied territories in 1919, but I would say that the real war started with the great Polish offensive in April of 1920.

Originally posted by Zbyszek
It was extremely difficult to determine areas where Poles were in majority because winds of history placed them in so many different places east or west.
... Pilsudski's policy was successful right after WWI but later on things got more and more difficult. Who, in wildest dreams, could predict Hitler's and Stalin's sick appetites?
I think Pilsudski's both non-agression agreements with Germany and Soviet Russia(yes!) were good political moves.

That was not an easy job, certainly. But, had there only been a good will - on both sides - it would be possible. Autumn of 1919 was the best moment for Pilsudski to approach "White" leaders with moderate and fair demands. The result most likely would have been destruction of Bolshevism and a good basis for the long-lasting friendly relations between the two states.

Everyone who knew what were the principles of Bolshevic ideology ("the World Revolution", for example) and who had read "Mein kamph" could predict Hitler's and Stalin's sick appetites. Having this in mind, I think it is very obvious that Pilsudski's non-agression agreements with Germany and Soviet Union were bad political moves. A bold action in cooperation with France was the only way out.

[Edited by generalzo on 28th July 2005 at 01:28]