Brezhnev Lite

[GHOST OF RONBO]

The definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting a different outcome. By this definition the Russians are insane.

Vladimir Putin's rule in Russia has been described as "Stalin Lite," but the article linked to below suggests a nearer parallel: the rule of 1970s-ear Soviet dictator Leonid Brezhnev. This was a period of relative stability for the Soviet Union, buoyed by high oil prices and Western disarray—but it also established all of the elements that led soon afterward to economic and political collapse.

Similarly, this article argues that Putin is establishing all of the preconditions for a new collapse. One-party rule is creating an unaccountable new "nomenklatura" whose corruption has destroyed property rights and caused a decline in domestic production, particularly agricultural production, while driving the average citizen to drink—a lot. (Per capita alcohol consumption is now higher than it was under Brezhnev.)

All of this is currently hidden by the spike in oil prices but is ready to come crashing down if oil prices drop.

"Back in the USSR?" Leon Aron, Washington Post, July 14

Vladimir Putin's appointment this spring as prime minister of the symbolic "union" of Russia and Belarus was yet another example of the troubling similarities between today's Russia and the other most stable and prosperous Russian regime of the past 80 years: Leonid Brezhnev's Soviet Union in the 1970s. That economy, too, was fueled by then-record oil prices. And while there are clear differences between the two Russias, if these tendencies go unchecked, the increasingly authoritarian and economically statist country may soon face crises of the kind that became apparent under Brezhnev and contributed to the Soviet Union's demise….

This spring, Putin admitted that 70 percent of the food consumed in Russia's largest cities is imported, a situation he decried as "intolerable." This problem, too, first surfaced in the 1970s, when grain imports were so high that by the end of the decade they supplied the flour for every third loaf of bread. When oil prices collapsed, Russia was forced to spend gold reserves and seek loans—and eventually found itself without grain or gold. After agricultural land was denationalized in the early 1990s, food became available almost immediately—for the first time in almost 70 years it could be had without hours-long lines and rationing coupons. Russia started to export grain. Yet agricultural land was never legally privatized, and rules for long-term leasing have been left to local authorities.

Not surprisingly, such legal gray areas have given rise to corruption, increased production costs and hampered innovation. Provincial governors, who are no longer elected and answer only to the president, pressure successful entrepreneurs and farmers to "share" with local authorities. A leading industrialist told me that at least six local agencies conduct almost weekly "inspections" of his potato farm. State agriculture subsidies often go to the largest and best politically connected enterprises, not necessarily the most productive ones….

Putin's remedies have the same flavor as Brezhnev's: Throw billions in subsidized credits and grants at the problem instead of strengthening property rights and making it easier for independent producers to compete.

A new oligarchy…. With virtually every top Putin official and adviser retained, sent to the Security Council or made "presidential envoy" to some part of the country, a new nomenklatura has emerged—insulated from media criticism, spared political competition and effectively immune from criminal prosecution. As in Soviet times, the members of this political master race are almost never fired, only retired with honors or reassigned….

The 1970s made clear what the belief in official infallibility and omnipotence, utter disregard for public opinion, ossification, and pandemic corruption could lead to. Most of all, the experience of Brezhnev's Russia confirms that authoritarian "stabilization" is a curious political commodity. Its benefits are instantly apparent but its price is revealed only gradually—and may be devastatingly high.